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Abstract—Wireless ad hoc networks have seen a great deal of 
attention in the past years, especially in cases where no 
infrastructure is available. The main goal in these networks 
is to provide good data accessibility for participants. Because 
of the wireless nodes’ continuous movement, network 
partitioning occurs very often. In order to subside the 
negative effects of this partitioning and improve data 
accessibility and reliability, data is replicated in nodes other 
than the original owner of data. This duplication costs in 
terms of nodes’ storage space and energy. Hence, 
autonomous nodes may behave selfishly in this cooperative 
process and do not replicate data. This kind of phenomenon 
is referred to as a strategic situation and is best modeled and 
analyzed using the game theory concept. In order to address 
this problem we propose a game theory data replication 
scheme by using the repeated game concept and prove that it 
is in the nodes’ best interest to cooperate fully in the 
replication process if our mechanism is used. 
Keywords-MANETs; game theory; repeated games; data 
replication;  
I.  INTRODUCTION  
By emerging advanced wireless computing devices and 
along that, the notable technological breakthrough in 
wireless technology, wireless computing has transformed 
from a faraway dream to a daily reality. Computers now 
have ample amount of storage space and massive 
computational power, which, gives new perspective to 
mobile ad hoc networks (MANETs). A mobile ad hoc 
network is a wireless peer to peer network which lacks any 
infrastructure or central server. In MANETs each node acts 
both as a router and a host. The ultimate goal of these 
networks is to provide data for other nodes [1]. In recent 
years a vast range of applications have used this 
technology, naming in battlefields, search and rescue 
operations, and many other such applications that are best 
served by the MANET technology. Network partitioning is 
a common property of MANETs, because nodes move 
freely and therefore data accessibility becomes an issue. 
Data replication is a well-known terminology that 
addresses the data accessibility problem. It means that data 
is copied in nodes other than the original owner of data. 
This mechanism improves the data accessibility and at the 
same time reduces the request delay [2]. 
In autonomous MANETs nodes may not be willing to 
cooperate fully, since, tasks like forwarding the received 
packets or participating in the replication process is costly 
from the nodes’ initial point of view. However, such 
selfishness and noncooperation not only deteriorates 
system efficiency but also reduces nodes’ performance. In 
game theory literature we call this dilemma a strategic 
situation [3, 4]. In a strategic situation the goal is to enact 
an equilibrium between gains and losses, which in our case 
is data accessibility versus nodes’ resources. Therefore, 
design and implementation of a mechanism that motivates 
the nodes to cooperate in the data replication process is of 
the utmost importance. Such mechanisms are implemented 
using the concepts provided by game theory literature [5-
8].  
In this paper we first discuss the necessity of data 
replication and then inspired by [2] we introduce a new 
utility function that incorporates both global parameters 
and local parameters in the nodes’ decision making process 
and name it self-global benefit (SGB). Since we assume 
that nodes are rational, it is understandable that each node 
tries to maximize its own benefit by maximizing its utility 
function. The problem that arises is that if every node tries 
to maximize its benefit unilaterally, then no node will 
cooperate fully in the data replication process and data 
accessibility deteriorates tremendously. So by using the 
repeated games concept in game theory, we propose a 
punishment mechanism that each node punishes its 
deviating neighbor for a period of time and since we 
presumed that nodes are rational, the deviating node 
rectifies its non-cooperative behavior to improve its utility 
and cooperates with other nodes. We then prove that this 
mechanism works theoretically.  
The remainder of this paper is arranged as follows. In 
section 2 we will review some of the related works. 
Section 3 will define and formulate the problem. Section 4 
will present the incentive mechanism using repeated games 
and proves that it works. Finally, in section 5 we conclude 
the paper and give insights for the future work. 
II. RELATED WORK 
There has been tremendous research effort in the area 
of data replication in wireless environments. Depending on 
the network management type, ad hoc networks can be 
divided into two groups: open networks and closed 
networks [18]. In a closed network, since the management 
is unique, the nodes cooperate with each other to achieve 
the manager’s goal in the network. On the other hand, in 
an open network nodes have autonomous management and 
therefore each node sees its own benefit. So depending on 
the application of the network and viewpoint of the 
authors, selfish behavior might or might not have a role in 
their approach. 
 In closed networks some works like [1, 9, 10] pay 
special attention to grouping nodes for data replica 
allocation. Other works like [11-13] take on an access 
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frequency approach and try to improve energy 
consumption and overall response time.  
The most recent work in this area [2] is a game theory 
approach that uses the idea of volunteers’ dilemma [3, 4] 
which in it each player makes a small sacrifice that will 
benefit the whole network. In their work, Hirsch and 
Madria [11] propose a method called CADR, where each 
node calculates a network global benefit NGB for caching 
a replica of a requested data. Multiple factors are 
considered in calculating NGB such as nodes’ history, 
transitory window of interest, replica usage, replica TTL 
and many others that make this method an outstanding one 
among its rivals. 
In open networks there has been various approaches 
towards addressing selfish nodes’ behavior. These 
techniques, according to [14], can be divided into three 
categories: credit based, payment based, and game theory 
based approaches. In credit based techniques each node 
monitors the behavior of others and uses the corresponding 
information to measure the degree of node selfishness [17, 
18]. In payment approaches, each node, rewards the node 
that forwards a packet [15-18]. The accumulated credit 
from these rewards is then used to send data to other 
nodes. In game theoretic approaches it is presumed that 
any rational node can find its optimum strategy to 
maximize its own benefit [7, 19]. Game theory methods 
usually try to find the Nash equilibrium [3, 4] in order to 
optimize the system performance. Although much effort 
has been done in game theory area, most of these solutions 
are for packet forwarding problem. 
Of the most recent works in this scope are the ones in 
[17, 18]. In their work, Choi et al. [17] use the concept of 
credit risk which every node in a MANET measures the 
credit risk information in order to estimate a node’s degree 
of selfishness. One particular problem in this method is 
that the selfish node may become completely isolated and 
therefore network partitioning occur. In [18] Ryu et al. 
improve the latter work and consider both node’s 
selfishness and node distance to choose better candidates 
for replicating data. At the same time the storage space in 
selfish nodes is also exploited for better efficiency.  
Here we briefly provide some differences between our 
work and some other similar approaches cited above. The 
primary difference between our work and the group found 
in [1, 9, 10], and access frequency, found in [11-13], is that 
these methods take a much localized view to determine 
replica placement while we try to see both global 
parameters and local parameters. More than that we 
consider selfish behavior in our model while the 
aforementioned works do not consider this type of 
behavior. 
Moreover, game theoretic approaches for replication in 
mobile environment have not been significantly used. The 
work in [2] just uses the idea of volunteers’ dilemma and 
the whole approach is based on other parameters and 
experimental results.  Hirsch and Madria in [11], also do 
not consider selfish behavior in mobile nodes. We try to 
improve this approach by providing solid formulation of 
repeated games and prove that our mechanism will work in 
the presence of selfish nodes. 
The main downside in [17, 18] is that they try to 
persuade the node to tell the truth. Although this is a good 
way for detecting selfish nodes, but a mechanism to 
enforce cooperation among nodes seems necessary.  
III. SYSTEM MODEL AND PUNISHMENT DESIGN  
In this section we model our solution for data 
replication using a game theory approach. We first 
introduce a new utility function, based on [2], and then 
propose our incentive mechanism. This mechanism holds 
if nodes act rationally. 
A.   System Model and Formulation 
This work is an extension of [2] with the focus on 
punishment mechanism design. We expand the 
aforementioned global benefit (NGB) and propose a self-
global benefit (SGB) utility function. In this criteria we 
try to consider the benefit of each node from the global 
point of view. Therefore, two local parameters, naming 
SDC and ODC are introduced. SDC is the cost for self-
data caching, meaning the cost incurred for replicating 
data in a node when the requester is the node itself. On the 
other hand, ODC is the cost for others’ data caching, 
meaning the cost incurred when replication is done for 
other nodes’ requests. Therefore we introduce our utility 
function as follows: 
 





In (1)  the NGB is like what it is defined in [2]. SDC and 
ODC are as follows: 
 
𝑆𝐷𝐶 =  𝑆𝑗  . 
𝑂𝐷𝐶 =  𝛼𝑗  ∑ 𝑆𝑗  ×  
𝑁
𝑗=1 𝐻𝑗
𝑘 +  𝑆𝑗 . 

 
Which Sj is the size of data item j, 𝛼𝑗 is the probability 
that data item j will be replicated in the node, and 𝐻𝑗
𝑘 is 
the request history for data item j requested in node k. 
The efficiency of this utility function is yet to be 
proved, but for our purpose we will discuss some 
parameters that are in direct relationship with the 
punishment mechanism design. 
Of the assumptions that we made was the fact that in 
our model, nodes have autonomous management and they 
act rationally. Having the utility function in (1) a node i 
selects its replicating probability, 𝛼𝑖, such that it 
maximizes the following utility function:  
 
It implies that node i will selfishly minimize 𝑂𝐷𝐶𝑖, 
the portion of resources used to replicate data for others. 
In the game theory literature [3-4, 19-22], Nash 
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Equilibrium (NE) states that in the equilibrium, every 
node selects the best response strategy to the other nodes’ 
strategy, the formal definition is given as follows: 
Definition 1: a Nash Equilibrium of a non-cooperative 
game 𝐺 = (𝑁, (𝑆𝑖)𝑖∈𝑁 , (𝑢𝑖)𝑖∈𝑁 ) is a strategy profile 




∗ ) ≥  𝑈𝑖(𝑠𝑖 , 𝑠−𝑖
∗ ) , ∀𝑠𝑖 ∈  𝑆𝑖  
 
Which in our case 𝑠𝑖 =  𝛼𝑖  ∈ [0, 1]. Given that 
every node plays NE, no node can improve its utility by 
unilaterally changing its own data replication probability. 
Here 𝛼−𝑖
∗  is the set of all strategies selected by all the 
nodes other than node i. 
In an ongoing relationship the promise of future 
reward and/or the threat of future punishment sometimes 
provide incentives for nodes to behave well now. This is 
best modeled by the concept of repeated games in game 
theory.  
Definition 2: let 𝐺 = (𝑁, (𝑆𝑖)𝑖∈𝑁 , (𝑢𝑖)𝑖∈𝑁) be a 
strategic game and 𝛿 ∈ (0, 1] be discount factor. The 
utility for a player i in the repeated game is given by:  
 






In this equation, 𝑎𝑖(𝑡) is node’s i action in the repeated 
game. If 𝑇 →  ∞ the game is referred to as repeated game 
with infinite horizon and the utility is normalized as in 
Eq.7. 
 






Since having a future motivates the players to behave 
well in the time being, we model our scenario to an 
infinite repeated game, where nodes do not know when 
the game finishes. The details of our punishment 
mechanism is described in the next section. 
. 
B.   Punishment Design 
Until now we have just discussed the necessity of a 
punishment in the case of misbehavior from nodes. In this 
subsection inspiring from [7] we describe a way of 
punishing deviating nodes. Firstly we need nodes to 
monitor each other in a distributed way and more than that 
we need to provide information for nodes to detect the 
deed of misbehaving. Therefore, we have two main 
assumptions: 
 
1) Every nodes has perfect awareness of the network. 
(With this assumption any deviation can be 
detected). 
2) Every node has at least one neighbor. (It is 
necessary to perform punishment task). 
With these assumptions we propose the following 3 
step rules to ensure that any individually rational utilities 
can be enforced. 
 Step 1 - The strategy of all nodes is cooperation 
if there is no deviation in the last stages. After 
any deviation go to step 2. 
 Step 2 - If a node (j) deviates, the nodes that can 
punish the deviating node play the punishment 
strategy for a period called punishment period. 
The rest of the nodes continue playing 
cooperation strategy. Any deviation in step 2 
causes this condition to restart and punishment 
continues. If the punishing node does not comply 
and refuse to play the punishment strategy, the 
other nodes will punish that particular node. 
Otherwise after the end of punishment period, go 
to step 3. 
 Step 3 - Play a strategy that results in(𝑈1, … .,
𝑈𝑗−1, 𝑈𝑗 −  𝜀, 𝑈𝑗+1, … , 𝑈𝑁). If there is any 
deviation in step 3, go back to step 2 and punish 
the deviating node. 
We need to mention that Eq.6 and Eq.7 are completely 
independent of Eq.4, so our proof stands to reason, no 
matter what the utility function is. In the next section we 
provide theoretical proof for our method 
IV. SYSTEM MODEL AND PUNISHMENT DESIGN PROOF 
For a node to be motivated to conform to cooperative 
strategy, it is necessary that the following holds:  
 
Profit of deviation – Threat of misbehaving < 0 
 
In the sequel we show that under our proposition’s 
assumption: 
 The profit gained by deviation is less than 
cooperation profit in any node. 
 The profit gained by the punishing node that does 
not play punishment strategy in punishment 
period is less than when it conforms to this 
strategy.  
 
In the following we prove that with the 3 step rules 
mentioned in the previous section, any rational individual 
chooses to cooperate in the data replication process [7]. 
If node j deviates in step 1, it gains the immediate 
profit ?̅?𝑗 for one period, 𝑢𝑗 for Tj periods when it is being 
punished and 𝑈𝑗 −  𝜀 after it conforms to the cooperative 
strategy. This three periods result in the average 
discounted utility as shown in Eq. 8.  
 
?̂?𝑗
∞ =  ?̅?𝑗 +  
𝛿(1 − 𝛿𝑇𝑗)
1 − 𝛿
 𝑢𝑗 +  
𝛿𝑇𝑗+1
1 − 𝛿
(𝑈𝑗 −  𝜀) (8) 
 
Since if a node cooperates throughout the game the 
average discounted utility becomes
1
1−𝛿
𝑈𝑗, thus, the gain of 
deviation is as follows. 
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 ∆𝑈𝑗 =  ?̂?𝑗
∞ −  
1
1 − 𝛿
 𝑈𝑗  (9) 
 
And by subtracting the two values we can see that:  
 
∆𝑈𝑗 <   ?̅?𝑗 +  
𝛿(1 − 𝛿𝑇𝑗 )
1 − 𝛿
 𝑢𝑗 −  
1 − 𝛿𝑇𝑗+1
1 − 𝛿
(𝑈𝑗 −  𝜀) (10) 
 
It is obvious that one stage NE is to 𝑢𝑗 = 0. If there 
exists a 𝜖 and the punishment period Tj such that  
 
and 𝛿 → 1 , the deviation gain will be strictly less than 
zero. Hence any rational node will see that the loss of 
deviation is more that its gain. Therefore, it will not 
deviate from the cooperative behavior. 
During the punishment stage the same logic stands 
since if the node being punished, continues to deviate it 
will postpone receiving strictly better utility 𝑈𝑗 −  𝜀 in 
step 3. Therefore it is better not to deviate in the 
punishment period. 
On another hand, if the punishing node i deviates from 
playing the punishment of node j, it receives at most: 
 
?̂?𝑖
∞ =  ?̅?𝑖 +  
𝛿(1 − 𝛿𝑇)
1 − 𝛿
 𝑢𝑖 +  
𝛿𝑇+1
1 − 𝛿
(𝑈𝑖 −  𝜀) (12) 
 
Let  𝜔𝑗
𝑖 be the utility of node i to punish node j, then if 
node i plays the punishment strategy, its gain will be  
 
𝑈𝑖




𝑖 +  
𝛿𝑇+1
1 − 𝛿
 𝑈𝑖  (13) 
 


















∞ =  𝑇.  𝜔𝑗





A 𝛿 close to one makes this expression to be always larger 
than zero. In fact the closer 𝛿 to one the more important 
the value of future is. 
The same argument applies for deviating in condition 
one and therefore we conclude that deviation in all 
conditions are not profitable. Therefore, based on the two 
assumptions mentioned at the beginning of this section, it 
is proved that any rational node will conform to 
cooperative strategy. 
V. CONCLUSION 
In this paper we proposed a repeated game mechanism 
to enforce cooperation in data replication between 
autonomous nodes in MANETs. We first described a 
utility function (SGB) that incorporated multiple criteria, 
including local parameters and global parameters. Then we 
described the incentive mechanism for cooperative data 
replication and proved that it works. We demonstrated, 
using the concept of infinite repeated games, that if the 
nodes are punished when they misbehave, a cooperation 
strategy can be sustained among nodes. This is because 
nodes are rational and deviation has the threat of 
punishment. So any rational node will cooperate in the data 
replication process.  
 For future work it is suggested that the utility function 
be thoroughly tested. We are also interested in testing our 
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